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Member States' actions in 2011-2012 will be critical in averting a "lost-decade scenario". Policy 
priorities, timing and content will have to be set according to national circumstances and reflect 
inter alia the risks to fiscal sustainability and the need to correct excessive imbalances. The most 
urgent task is to break the vicious circle at work in some Member States of unsustainable debt, 
financial market disruption and low economic growth. While the draft National Reform 
Programmes submitted in November acknowledge the urgency of addressing the macro-
economic challenges in an integrated way, they often fall short of proposing adequate policy 
responses. 
This supporting document therefore aims at pinpointing measures that have the highest potential 
of delivering positive macro-economic effects and that Member States could consider 
implementing in the coming two year. The first section sets the scene by looking at the 
imbalances and weaknesses that had emerged before the crisis and at the legacy of the worst 
economic crisis since the Great Depression in the 1930s. The second section focuses on the need 
to set public finances back on track. The third section makes the case for healing the financial 
sector swiftly. The last section highlights the urgency of structural reforms to correct 
macroeconomic imbalances and to fix the ailing growth drivers. 
1.  EUROPE GOING THROUGH PARTICULARLY CHALLENGING TIMES  
The European economy is slowly emerging from the deepest recession in decades. The 
economic crisis resulted in a large loss in economic activity in the EU, accompanied with 
millions of jobs lost and a high human cost. The structural weaknesses pre-dating the crisis which 
had not been tackled adequately became blatantly apparent.  
The EU suffered from structural weaknesses before the crisis.  
While the EU is a wealthy area, its economic growth in the past decade has been weak by 
international standards (see Graph 1). In terms of GDP per capita, the EU-27 is much richer 
than the G20 average, but remains well below many non-EU OECD countries and the OECD as a 
whole. At the same time, its growth performance since 2000 has been very disappointing, below 
all the developed economies bar Japan and clearly behind most emerging economies. This means 
that the gap with regard to other developed economies is increasing. As catching up cannot 
explain the difference, EU's weak growth performance must be related to structural weaknesses. 
When one goes beyond GDP-type indicators, this overall dull picture conceals some strength in 
terms of life standards, such as relatively low income inequality, high life expectancy and EN  3     EN 
relatively high environmental performance (for instance as measured by CO2 emissions by unit 
of output). 
Various "bottlenecks" held back growth in the EU over the past decade. Standard growth 
accounting reveals that before the crisis (2001-07) labour productivity was the main driving force 
behind growth, while labour utilisation and the increase in working-age population only 
accounted for around one fourth of total growth; in particular, decreasing labour market 
participation of youth and prime-age men and a reduction in hours worked per persons were 
dragging growth down in the EU-27 (see Graph 2). The crisis darkened the picture further. It led 
to a contraction of GDP, with a sharp increase in unemployment and a significant drop in total 
factor productivity (TFP), mostly explained by the strong decrease in capacity utilisation. The EU 
and the euro area are clearly lagging behind the US and Japan as regards both TFP levels and 
labour utilisation; on the latter, the difference is especially profound at both ends of the age 
spectrum, as seen in the blatant difference in employment rates (see Graph 3). 
Graph 1: GDP level and growth 
GDP per capita in 2010 (% differential vis-à-vis EU-27 in PPS) 
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Graph 2:Decomposition of GDP growth   Graph 3: Employment rate 
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Graph 4: Real primary expenditure versus real GDP growth 
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over average real GDP growth. EN  5     EN 
In the years preceding the crisis, several EU Member States deviated from the basic 
principles of prudent fiscal policy making. Significant revenue windfalls generated by the 
economic expansion in 2003-2007 were only partially used to accelerate fiscal adjustment. A 
non-negligible part went into additional spending: the growth rate of primary expenditure 
exceeded the average rate of economic growth in twelve EU Member States in the good times 
preceding the crisis (2003-2007), by a large margin in some cases (see Graph 4).The untenable 
nature of this policy choice became apparent with the onset of the crisis, when the collapse of 
government revenues suddenly revealed vulnerable underlying budgetary positions with, in many 
cases, little or no fiscal space left to respond to the economic contraction. 
Over the decade preceding the crisis, macroeconomic imbalances in the EU increased 
considerably as well. Some Member States saw the building-up of significant domestic 
imbalances. This was reflected in the strong divergence in current accounts and competitiveness 
developments, as seen in Graph 5 for the euro area. Moreover, some euro area Member States 
have experienced a worrying loss in export market shares. External imbalances were fed by 
inappropriate responses of wages to productivity developments, excessive credit growth in the 
private sector, housing price bubbles as well as structural weaknesses of domestic demand
1.  
Graph 5: Evolution of price competitiveness relative to the rest of the euro area  
(indices; 1998 = 100, increases represent losses in competitiveness) 
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1  See European Commission (2010), Surveillance of intra-euro-area competitiveness and imbalances, 
European Economy 1. EN  6     EN 
Impact of crisis on the real economy and employment 
Graph 6: GDP and employment  
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Sources: Eurostat; ECFIN Autumn forecast  
Note: the profile for forecast employment – available on an annual basis only – has been interpolated linearly to 
deduce its quarterly profile. 
The deep contraction in GDP wiped out on average four years of growth. The loss in output 
in 2008 and 2009 sent the EU GDP back to 2006 level. The EU is expected to recover the output 
level seen in the first quarter of 2008 – before the crisis hit the real economy – in the second 
quarter of 2012 only, according to the Commission’s Autumn 2010 economic forecast (Graph 6). 
By the end of 2011, only ten Member States are projected to have returned to their output levels 
in 2008 or above. By the end of 2012, eleven Member States are still expected to remain at output 
levels below those preceding the crisis. Employment is projected still to fall short of its pre-crisis 
level at the end of 2012 (by over 1%).  
The crisis has taken a heavy toll on Europe's societies with a sharp rise in unemployment. 
The unemployed represented 7% of the labour force in the EU-27 in 2008. In 2010, they 
accounted for almost 10%, with the prospect of the unemployment rate remaining above 9% in 
2012, as displayed in Graph 7. The unemployment rate is particularly high, exceeding 12%, in 
Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania and Spain. Long-term unemployment – 
those unemployed for more than one year – has increased steeply and currently represents around 
40% of total unemployment in the EU. This highlights the risk of durable exclusion from the 
labour market. The rate of unemployment is particularly high amongst the low-skilled, the 
migrants and the youth. Youth unemployment exceeds 20% in more than half of the EU Member 
States and reaches 42% in one country (Spain). EN  7     EN 
Graph 7: Actual and structural unemployment rates in the EU-27  
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The crisis decreased potential growth further through the strong rise in structural 
unemployment and the sharp drop in the investment rate. Potential output growth in the EU-
27 is expected to be particularly low (1.1%) over the forecasting horizon (2010-12), owing to 
both low productivity growth and low labour utilisation. The situation is expected to be even 
more lacklustre in the euro area, with broadly similar but more acute patterns. The lower use of 
labour is related to the significant rise in NAWRU (see Graph 7) but also to the further decline in 
average hours worked per worker and the contraction of working-age population. Potential 
growth will also be affected by slower capital accumulation resulting from historically low 
investment rates in the wake of the crisis, and by slow total factor productivity growth which is 
gradually recovering but only towards the already weak pre-crisis path. 
Fiscal imbalances aggravated, with a slow reduction of macro imbalances  
Graph 8: Public debt level in 2008 and its forecast rise over 2008-2012  
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Sources: ECFIN Autumn forecast  
The crisis had a dramatic impact on public finances in the euro area and the EU. Within a 
short period of time, government debt-to-GDP ratios increased sharply in almost all Member 
States wiping out the moderate progress achieved in the pre-crisis years (see Graph 8). At the end 
of 2010 gross government debt is expected to have climbed to around 84% of GDP in the euro 
area and around 79% of GDP in the EU, some 20 percentage points above the 2007 levels. At 
current policies the upward trend is set to continue. EN  8     EN 
The current sharp deterioration of public finances results from a decline in revenues and 
increased pressures on expenditure as well as discretionary fiscal stimuli. Government 
finances in some Member States had become dependent upon highly cyclical or temporary 
revenue sources. This contributed to the collapse in government revenues on the back of a sharp 
contraction in economic activity while government expenditures were broadly kept at previously 
planned levels. Member States allowed their automatic stabilisers to fully function, which helped 
to soften the impact of global crisis on real economy. However, as this was insufficient to stem 
the fall in demand and avert the risk of a meltdown of financial systems, most EU governments 
also implemented discretionary fiscal measures under the common framework of the European 
Economic Recovery Programme launched by the European Commission in December 2008.  
This recent added pressure on public finances comes on top of the negative public finance 
effects of demographic ageing. This process has been in the offing for a long time and, in the 
absence of reforms taken soon, will inexorably produce a significant budgetary burden in the 
long-term, which will further aggravate the already worrying fiscal situation. With unchanged 
policies, public support for the elderly in terms of provision of pensions and other old-age 
benefits (healthcare and long-term care) is projected to increase by some 4½ percentage points of 
GDP in the EU over the next 50 years. In around one third of the Member States, the increase in 
ageing-related government spending is likely to exceed 7 percentage points of GDP. 
The crisis has only partly, and temporarily, corrected the large macroeconomic imbalances 
prevailing in many Member States before its outbreak. As the current recession has 
compressed excessive demand and removed or mitigated some drivers of divergence (i.e. housing 
market bubbles and credit expansion), the current account deficits have decreased. However, 
current account imbalances remain significant, especially within the euro area, and are not 
expected to unwind quickly, as seen in Graph 9. Graph 10 shows that those EU Member States 
which recorded a large deficit (surplus) in the balance of goods and services at the onset of the 
crisis were generally still in deficit (surplus) two years later, when economic activity picked up. 
This partly reflects structural weaknesses, such as weaknesses in domestic demand (in surplus 
countries) and weak price and cost competitiveness, often combined with high debt levels (in 
deficit countries).  
Graph 9:  Decomposition of the 
current account, euro area 
Graph 10: Balance of goods and services and its forecast change 
up to 2010 
(positive values= surplus; negative values= deficit; % GDP)  
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Sources: ECFIN Autumn forecast.   Note: Euro area Member States are identified as surplus or deficit 
countries on the basis of their current account position in 2006. EN  9     EN 
The need for differentiated policy responses across Member States 
Graph 11: Differentiated starting conditions in 2010 
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Source: ECFIN Autumn forecast 
*External account deficit means net borrowing vis-à-vis the rest of the world (current account plus capital 
transactions). This concept shows the annual change in external indebtedness. 
** Net imports of goods and services is also called 'deficit in the balance of goods and services', and is directly 
influenced by price competitiveness. The surplus for LU exceeds 30% of GDP, outside the boundaries of this chart.  
EU Member States experienced highly different fiscal and external conditions, which call 
for tailor-made policies. Graph 11 shows in a purely illustrative manner and using different 
indicators that some Member States face particularly pressing challenges in terms of adjusting 
their unsustainable public finances and correcting their external imbalances. A one-size-fits-all 
approach will not work, and Member States' priorities in 2011-2012 should be shaped inter alia 
by risks to fiscal sustainability and the need to correct imbalances. Member States with large EN  10     EN 
fiscal and/or macroeconomic imbalances face a hard constraint on their policy options and 
should, as a matter of priority, correct existing imbalances. Member States without major 
macroeconomic problems or discernable risks should strive to improve longer-term growth 
drivers, while preventing the occurrence of future imbalances. 
2.  REINING IN PUBLIC DEBT THROUGH A RIGOROUS AND DURABLE FISCAL 
CONSOLIDATION  
The need to consolidate now 
Graph 12: Structural deficits and MTOs 
(% GDP) 
-11
-9
-7
-5
-3
-1
1
B
E
D
E
E
E
I
E
E
L
E
S
F
R
I
T
C
Y
L
U
M
T
N
L
A
T
P
T
S
I
S
K
F
I
E
A
B
G
C
Z
D
K
L
V
L
T
H
U
P
L
R
S
E
U
K
E
U
Structural deficit 2010 MTO  
While the crisis has hit government budgets in all EU Member States, the actual state of 
public finances varies significantly across Member States. As displayed in Graph 12, the 
distance of the deficit – corrected for the business cycle and one-off measures, i.e. structural 
deficit – from the medium-term budgetary objective (MTO) is particularly large (more than five 
percentage points of GDP) in twelve Member States. Member States which followed a more 
cautious course of fiscal policy ahead of the unprecedented economic downturn are in a 
comparatively better situation. They had more fiscal space to lean against the headwinds of the 
recession and, as a result, have accumulated lower fiscal imbalances during the crisis. 
Withdrawing the discretionary fiscal stimulus implemented during the crisis will not be 
sufficient to restore long-term sustainability of public finances. The debt-to-GDP ratio will 
not only suffer from the accumulation of public deficits but also from the implicit liabilities 
foreseeable with population ageing and the expected slow medium-term growth in the euro area 
and the EU. Moreover, government debt ratios in the EU have now reached levels beyond which 
additional government borrowing acts as a drag on economic growth rather than stimulating it. 
Servicing high government debt levels requires higher potentially distortive taxes and crowds out 
productive government spending through higher interest expenditure or both. Further debt 
building is also likely to increase the risk premia on government bonds further, raising the debt EN  11     EN 
servicing burden even more, generating an unsustainable dynamic and eventually casting doubt 
on governments' solvency in financial markets.  
The adjustment effort required to put public finances back to a sustainable path is very 
significant and should be complemented by growth policies. Simple simulations indicate that 
an annual improvement of the structural budget balance of 0.5% of GDP - the conventional 
benchmark under the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) - would clearly be 
insufficient in many EU Member States to bring the debt to GDP ratio close to the Treaty-based 
threshold of 60% of GDP in the foreseeable future (see Graph 13). Only fiscal corrections of 1% 
of GDP per year or more would put debt levels in percent of GDP on a firm downward path over 
the coming two decades. However, fiscal consolidation, while absolutely necessary, might not 
always be sufficient to reverse adverse debt dynamics quickly and durably. Stronger output 
growth is imperative to increase fiscal revenue and lower unemployment-related expenditures, 
while automatically reducing the level of debt expressed as a share of GDP.  
Graph 13: Public debt projection in the EU 
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Note: the projections assume the given rate of consolidation for each Member State until it meets its medium-term 
budgetary objective (MTO).  
As a result, fiscal policy makers in the EU face a formidable double challenge: putting fiscal 
policy back on a sustainable path while protecting or supporting short-run economic growth and 
employment. Under current circumstances, there is reason to believe that getting public finances 
in order will have a positive impact on economic growth in the medium run. Delaying fiscal 
adjustment would only push out and compound the problem. It would seriously compromise our 
ability to actively shape our future, and heavily mortgage future generations.  
Although the degree of urgency is not the same in all Member States, consolidation remains 
a key policy priority for all. In 2010, fiscal policy continued to support aggregate demand in the 
EU and the euro area. As economic recovery is expected to gain gradually momentum in the 
coming years, it is time to switch the policy stance. Member States with very large structural EN  12     EN 
budget deficits or very high public debt-to-GDP ratios should be frontloading their adjustment in 
2011-12. This should be the case in particular for Member States facing high levels of financial 
distress: some Member States such as Greece and Ireland will accelerate their adjustment in both 
years, while Spain and Portugal will only do so in 2012. 
Key ingredients for a durable and growth-friendly consolidation 
History provides rich evidence on how to turn fiscal consolidation into a success in terms of 
both its lasting effect on public finances through time and the impact on economic growth. 
The lessons of the past concern five interrelated dimensions of fiscal policy making: the 
composition of fiscal adjustment, the credibility of the policy strategy, the institutional context, 
complementary policy initiatives and the burden sharing across society. 
(1)  Composition of fiscal adjustment: The single most important factor discriminating 
between success and failure of fiscal consolidation is the composition of adjustment. 
Expenditure-based corrections, especially corrections of current primary expenditure, are 
more likely to produce a lasting improvement in public finances and a milder, under some 
circumstances even a positive, impact on short-run economic growth than revenue-based 
corrections. Curbing expenditure developments is less distortive for growth than raising 
the tax burden, which is already high in the EU though significant variation exists among 
the Member States. In terms of credibility, expenditure cuts demonstrate a stronger 
commitment of the government to pursuing consolidation efforts. Revenue increases and 
cuts of investment expenditure may be easier to implement politically, yet weigh on the 
medium- to long-run growth prospects of an economy and are often reversed over time. In 
many Member States expenditure control will have to be supplemented by revenue-
raising measures. Due attention should also be given to the quality of taxation, by 
collecting revenues in an efficient way and minimising the negative impact on economic 
growth while taking equity considerations into account. Broadening tax bases, for 
example by removing environmentally harmful tax exemptions or tax credits, is preferable 
to increasing tax rates. Some existing tax expenditures may have no sound economic 
rationale or provide incentives not in line with their original aims. Tax on immovable 
property followed by consumption taxes, including environmentally related taxes, are 
least distortive, while personal income taxes and corporate income taxes could have a 
more harmful impact on growth. 
(2)  Credibility of the policy strategy:  Convincing and credible plans can generate 
expectations of lower real interest rates and lower future tax liabilities and, hence, have 
the potential of boosting consumption spending of private households and investment 
spending of firms. In practice, the credibility of a multi-annual adjustment plan can be 
bolstered by front-loading legislation setting out in a legally binding way a roadmap of 
successive measures that contribute to the planned multi-annual adjustment.  
(3)  Fiscal institutions: The success of fiscal consolidation also depends on the government's 
capacity effectively to implement the agreed policy measures via adequate national fiscal 
frameworks. The quality of the institutional and procedural arrangements governing 
budgetary policies, such as fiscal rules and multi-annual fiscal frameworks, influences the EN  13     EN 
ability of governments to draw up and effectively put into practice fiscal consolidation 
programmes without creating excessive political and economic frictions. 
(4)  Flanking policies: Budgetary policies typically interact with other instruments of 
economic policy making. This is also the case for fiscal consolidation. The 
complementary implementation of structural reforms will raise the odds of achieving a 
lasting fiscal correction, which also protects economic growth in the short run. The 
channels through which structural reforms help fiscal consolidation are twofold: directly 
by capping or flattening existing expenditure trends and indirectly by improving the 
functioning of markets which, in the end, supports economic activity. In actual fact, it is 
the structural reform dimension which confers and ensures the lasting character of a fiscal 
adjustment. Some structural reforms, notably reforms of pension systems, could have a 
positive impact on public finances already in the medium term through curbing 
expenditures and increasing labour supply. 
(5)  Socially-balanced  fiscal adjustments: Ensuring sound public budgets is a necessary 
condition to avoid that public debt growing out of control puts in jeopardy our social 
security systems in the future. In order to achieve the necessary political acceptance, the 
burden of adjustment needs to be distributed fairly across the different layers of society. 
Adjustments skewed towards specific constituencies are likely to be reverted as the 
political composition of governments change endangering the sustainability of fiscal 
adjustment. 
Policy priorities 
In order to address the challenges outlined above, action is needed in particular in the following 
areas in 2011-2012: 
•  At the EU level, the legislative proposals to strengthen economic governance should be 
adopted according to the fast-track agreement between the co-legislators. 
•  Consolidation in all EU Member States should imperatively start – or continue – in 2011. 
The planned pace of the fiscal consolidation should be ambitious, and will have to go well 
beyond the benchmark of 0.5% of GDP per annum in structural terms in most Member States. 
Member States facing very large structural budget deficits, very high levels of public debt or 
high levels of financial distress need to frontload their efforts in 2011.  Where economic 
growth or revenues turn out to be higher than expected, fiscal consolidation should be 
accelerated. 
•  Member States in excessive deficit procedure should set out the expenditure path and the 
broad measures they intend to take in order to achieve the elimination of their excessive 
deficits.  
•  All Member States should primarily adjust government expenditure, while protecting 
growth friendly expenditure e.g. in the area of public infrastructure, education and research 
and innovation. All Member States, especially those in excessive deficit procedure, should 
pursue prudent fiscal policy by keeping public expenditure growth firmly below the rate of 
medium term trend GDP growth. This should be complemented by efforts to raise the cost-EN  14     EN 
efficiency of public expenditures. Where adjustment needs are particularly pressing, 
expenditure should be reduced. All Member States need to demonstrate that their Stability or 
Convergence Programmes are based on prudent growth and revenue forecasts.  
•  When a contribution from taxes is necessary, economic distortions should be minimised. 
At any given level of the overall tax burden, tax systems should be reviewed to make them 
more employment, environment and growth-friendly, for example via "green tax reforms" 
which consist of increasing environmental taxes while reducing other more distortionary taxes. 
Broadening the tax base is preferable to raising tax rates. 
•  Pension reforms, aiming inter alia at raising the effective retirement age, should be 
enacted and implemented without delay. This will ensure the sustainability of public 
finances and lead to an increase in active population. Health care systems need to be 
rigorously monitored and, where needed, reformed to ensure greater cost-efficiency and 
sustainability, especially in regard to demographic ageing.  
•  Member States are encouraged to improve their domestic fiscal frameworks, in the area 
of national systems of public accounting and statistics, macroeconomic and budgetary 
forecasts, numerical fiscal rules, medium term budgetary frameworks, transparency of general 
government finances and comprehensive scope of budgetary frameworks.  
3.  HEALING THE FINANCIAL SECTOR SWIFTLY TO FIND THE PATH TO RECOVERY  
Graph 14: Bank lending in the EU 
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Source: ECB. 
There is a strong correlation between a healthy credit expansion and sustained economic 
development. Since the outbreak of the financial crisis, credit growth is subdued, notably in 
corporate lending, as banks have tightened credit standards and firms' demand for financing is 
low given the poor economic outlook. Since the beginning of 2010 a pick-up in lending is 
noticeable and coincides with a timid recovery (see Graph 14). The ECB Bank Lending Survey 
of October 2010 shows that banks have stopped tightening lending conditions for enterprises and EN  15     EN 
an easing of standards is expected for households. However, the lending conditions are not 
consistent with a strong economic recovery, especially regarding the loans to non-financial 
corporations (see Annex table).  
Balance sheet repair in the banking sector is essential to improve cost efficiency, restore 
competitiveness and return to normal lending. Yet, banks' profitability outlook is uncertain amid 
a sluggish recovery, heavy exposures to the real estate sector and tensions in the sovereign debt 
market. The negative feedback-loop from the real economy to the financial sector has been 
reinforced in some Member States with high household and non-financial corporate sector 
indebtedness. As a result, the level of non-performing loans has increased considerably and may 
increase further in the near term (Graph 15). Recently the overall situation of the banking sector 
has shown tentative improvement, with higher profits and a strengthening of the capital buffers, 
though in some cases it reflects capital injections by the government.  
A swift exit from sizable public support to banks will remove possible distortions to 
competition in the financial industry. In more than half of the Member States government 
assistance exceeded 5% of GDP and included measures such as capital injections, liquidity 
interventions, asset relief and guarantees (see Graph 16). Exit strategies from public support to 
banks have been initiated while maintaining flexibility in order to address possible macro-
financial stability concerns. Cross border effects of the public interventions have to be taken into 
account due to the high financial integration in the European Union as illustrated by the level of 
banking sector assets abroad which attains 50% of GDP for many Member States (see Graph 14). 
Graph 15: Non-performing loans in the EU 
Percentage of total loans 
Graph 16: Public interventions in the EU 
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Source: ECB, IMF  Source: Commission Services (January 2010).  
Confidence in the banking sector is a prerequisite for maintaining financial stability. One of 
the tools to maintain confidence on the speed of the exit strategies is the stress test exercise. The 
objective of the exercise is to assess the banking sector's resilience to low-probability but high-
impact events. The sensitivity of the capital buffer is examined to adverse economic and financial 
conditions. Based on rigorous assumptions, the next EU-wide stress test exercise will be 
conducted in 2011. The results of the next exercise will be available in June 2011.  A good EN  16     EN 
cooperation among national supervisors and EU authorities is critical in this context as well as a 
clear and transparent communication of the results and their implications.  
Graph 17: Banking sector assets abroad  
Percentage of GDP 
Graph 18: Total banking sector assets  
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The recent crisis has exposed a clear gap in the EU regulatory framework for the banking 
sector and strengthened the case for action at EU level. The interconnectedness of banks and 
financial institutions across EU Member States – and with non-EU countries – underscores the 
importance to monitor developments in the financial sector in an international context. The size 
of the banking sector assets measured as a percentage of GDP points to the particular 
vulnerability of some Member States in case of a systemic crisis and the blatant insufficiency of 
the fiscal means to deal with major financial disruptions (Graph 18). Accordingly, at the EU level 
the regulatory and supervisory framework has been strengthened and should be completed 
rapidly. In October 2010, the Commission outlined the aims of the legal framework for crisis 
management in the financial sector, which will be proposed in spring 2011. The overriding aim is 
to allow a bank to fail – irrespective of its size – while ensuring the continuity of essential 
banking services, minimising the impact of that failure on the financial system and avoiding costs 
to taxpayers. This is essential to avoid the 'moral hazard' that arises from the perception that some 
banks are too big to fail. Beyond equipping the authorities with common and effective tools and 
powers to tackle bank crisis, it is also essential to ensure a smooth cooperation among the 
Member States and the EU institutions both in advance of and during a crisis.  
A permanent "European Stability Mechanism" will be established by euro area Member 
States to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as whole. It will replace the current 
European Stabilisation Mechanism, which consists of the European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF) and the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), which will remain in force 
until June 2013.  
Basel III rules impose tougher capital requirements on banks, which will enhance macro-
financial stability. In September 2010, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision announced 
a substantial strengthening of existing capital definitions. In general, banks' capital will be lower 
according to the new definition, which increases the gap with the regulatory requirements. In EN  17     EN 
addition to stricter definitions, the minimum capital requirements will also be gradually 
increased. 
Policy priorities 
In order to address the challenges that were outlined above, action is needed in particular in the 
following areas in 2011-2012. In this, coordination at EU level is of paramount importance. 
•  Restructuring of banks, and particularly those which received significant amounts of State aid, 
is essential to restore their long-term viability and ensure a properly functioning credit 
channel. Bank restructuring will therefore safeguard financial stability and underpin the 
provision of credit to the real economy. Public financial support for the banking sector as a 
whole should be gradually withdrawn, taking into account the need to safeguard financial 
stability.  
•  Progress is needed in establishing a permanent mechanism for resolving sovereign debt 
crises so as to provide certainty and stability in financial markets. In 2013, the new 
European Stability Mechanism will provide stability in markets and complement the new 
framework for reinforced economic governance, aiming at an effective and rigorous economic 
surveillance, including reviewing the effectiveness of the current financial backstops.  
•  The implementation of financial reforms must continue, including a reinforcement of the 
regulatory and supervisory framework and addressing the market failures exposed by the 
crisis. At EU level, the regulatory framework must be further reinforced, while the quality of 
supervision should be enhanced by the ESRB and European Supervisory Authorities, which 
are operational as of the beginning of 2011.  
•  Banks will be required progressively to strengthen their capital base so as to improve 
their capacity to withstand adverse shocks. This is in accordance with the recently agreed 
Basel III framework. In addition, another more ambitious and stringent EU-wide stress test 
will be conducted in 2011 with a view to assessing the resilience of the banking sector.  
4.  STRUCTURAL REFORMS TO SUPPORT GROWTH AND CORRECT MACROECONOMIC 
IMBALANCES 
Structural reforms can serve two goals: restoring the main growth drivers, and preventing 
or correcting imbalances as a key framework condition for growth. These reforms can boost 
the use of labour and labour productivity.  Structural reforms can also help restore 
competitiveness and reduce external imbalances in the short run by reducing price and wage 
rigidities.Facilitating the needed reallocation of labour and capital across sectors and firms is 
instrumental for both growth and the reduction of external imbalances. While many structural 
measures could support both growth and macroeconomic adjustment, some of them, such as 
educational policies, require more time to pay off and are better suited to unlock long-term 
growth drivers. Nevertheless, this does not mean that action to strengthen these policies should be 
deferred. EN  18     EN 
Accelerating reforms to raise growth and jobs 
In the absence of resolute policies, potential growth is likely to remain weak in the coming 
decade
2. Over the period 2011-20, the average potential growth rate is projected to be around 
1½% in the EU-27 in absence of policy changes, as seen in Graph 19. This is significantly lower 
than the rates observed in the EU in the past two decades, which were, moreover, much lower 
than those recorded in the US. This is accounted for by the pronounced underutilisation of labour 
in the wake of the crisis, combined with the contraction of labour due to population ageing at the 
end of the period and fairly slow productivity growth in the EU-27. Most Member States have 
been strongly affected by the crisis, through both capital accumulation and labour utilisation, and 
are expected to record a reduction in their labour resources at the end of the decade owing to the 
population ageing. 
Graph 19: Potential output growth up to 2020 in the EU-27  
Macroeconomic scenario based on the production function approach 
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
01
03
05
07
09
11
13
15
17
19
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
labour productivity
Total Labour (Hours 
Potential Growth  
Source: ECFIN Autumn forecast 
Confirming past trends, the growth outlook is even worse in the euro area. Over the period 
2001-2010, average potential growth was 1. 6% in the euro area, as compared with 1.8% in the 
EU-27 (Graph 20). The picture for output growth and productivity growth will be particularly 
gloomy for the euro area in the decade ahead, as both are expected to stand at around 1¼% on 
average. However, the projected use of labour is very similar to that expected for the EU as a 
whole.  
                                                 
2  Potential growth corresponds to a concept of sustainable trend growth compatible with supply-side 
conditions, correcting for the short-term cyclical fluctuations in actual GDP growth. EN  19     EN 
 
Graph 20: Potential output growth up to 2020 in the euro area  
Macroeconomic scenario based on the production function approach 
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The experiences from past economic and financial crises indicate that policy responses 
matter greatly. For example, the deep recessions which started in 1991 in Sweden and Finland 
were relatively short lived and did not result in a reduction in potential output growth. This was 
inter alia thanks to significant restructuring of their economies. On the other hand, an insufficient 
policy reaction to the financial crisis, combined with mounting competitive pressures from 
emerging economies, contributed to the slowdown in long-run potential growth in Japan in the 
course of 1990s.  
Urgent actions are required both at national and EU level. EU-level policies will contribute to 
raising growth by, for instance, strengthening the Single Market and facilitating the conditions for 
investment In all Member States, removing the most important bottlenecks to growth in the 
medium-term would imply frontloaded structural reform efforts (for more detail, see the progress 
report on Europe 2020 annexed to the Annual Growth Survey).  
Correcting macro imbalances and restoring the key framework condition of growth  
Tackling external imbalances is particularly relevant for the euro area and will require 
comprehensive structural reforms geared at speeding-up and improving adjustment. The 
correction of imbalances is crucial for the EU and even more so for the euro area, as a monetary 
union. Imbalances in some euro area Member States may also undermine the credibility of the 
single currency. Economic policy actions will be needed in many different areas including in 
labour, product and services markets. The policy response will have to differ significantly across 
Member States and will have to be carefully designed to address the specific vulnerabilities and 
needs of the country concerned while taking into account potential spillovers across the EU. In 
general, structural policies should strive to make the economies more flexible to cater for the 
adjustment needs in the EU.  EN  20     EN 
Graph 21: Net external financial liabilities; 
euro area Member States  
% GDP  
Graph 22: Net external financial liabilities; 
non-euro area Member States 
% GDP (different scale from Graph 23)  
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Note: Data are not available for Cyprus, United Kingdom, Malta and Luxembourg 
For Member States showing large current account deficits, weak competitiveness and weak 
adjustment capacity, large price and cost adjustments will be needed to restore domestic 
and external competitiveness. An important metric to assess the sustainability of current 
account deficits is the overall net foreign asset position, measuring the level of external debt 
(Graphs 21 and 22). Despite the reduction in the level of current account deficits following the 
crisis, large deficit Member States have continued to see their debt grow vis-à-vis the rest of the 
world. While market mechanisms could drive this adjustment by a strong contraction in domestic 
demand and a large unemployment rise, a faster and less painful adjustment could be achieved 
via appropriate wage policies. These would include changes to wage indexation rules, appropriate 
signals from public sector wage settlements and more efficient wage setting mechanisms. Product 
market reforms will also be necessary to tackle nominal rigidities and reduce the final good prices 
by lowering the embedded rent (i.e. lower mark-up of prices over costs). The full implementation 
of the services directive, which will enhance competition in regulated services, is a particularly 
important policy step. Policies to strengthen non-price competitiveness are also essential in this 
respect. 
Measures tackling the nominal rigidities would need to be completed by structural 
measures supporting the reallocation of labour across firms and sectors. Moving the 
economy to a more sustainable path will require unwinding all past excesses and therefore not 
only improving the price-competitiveness of the export sector and reducing the relative prices of 
non-tradable. The price rebalancing will be associated with rechanneling of capital and labour 
resources from the non-tradable to the tradable sector, directly exposed to foreign competition. 
On the labour side, this reallocation will include an adaptation of employment protection 
legislation and better financial incentives to move from unemployment to employment.  This 
reallocation will be supported by relative wage adjustment between tradable and non-tradable 
sectors. Active labour market policies will have a supporting role: strengthening placement 
agencies, providing training, and better targeting active labour market policies to most vulnerable EN  21     EN 
groups. The improvement in the business environment, implying enhancing competition in 
regulated services and further reduction in administrative burdens, may support capital mobility 
in the direction of the most productive sectors. 
In Member States with large current account surpluses, the sources of persistently weak 
domestic demand need to be identified. Recent data are encouraging and indicate that an 
adjustment is ongoing with domestic demand increasingly gaining strength and past (corporate) 
balance sheet adjustment processes coming to an end. However, where domestic demand still 
remains somewhat subdued due to a policy or market failure, appropriate policies should be put 
in place. Such policies could include further liberalisation of the services sector and improving 
the conditions for investment. 
Policies need to be put in place to prevent imbalances from emerging in the future. The 
conditions that have led to excessive credit growth and asset price bubbles will need to be 
reviewed. A key challenge for policy makers will therefore be to devise and put in place 
structural reforms that limit the occurrence of credit and asset price excesses but also to devise 
specific instruments to cool-off demand if necessary. Regulatory measures reducing the pro-
cyclicality of credit supply appear to be particularly relevant in this context and more work is 
needed. Without prejudice to the internal market, this could mean to ensure that bank capital 
requirements duly reflect regional differences in asset price overvaluation. Structural features of 
the housing market that increase the likelihood of bubble building including tax incentives for 
mortgages need to be reviewed. Moreover, improved flexibility and adjustment capacities of the 
economies through product markets and will render them more resilient and facilitate the 
necessary adjustments in case of major shocks. 
Policy priorities 
In order to address the challenges that were outlined above, action is needed in particular in the 
following areas in 2011-2012: 
•  EU-level growth drivers must be mobilised. Agreements should be sought on key legislative 
proposals in the context of the Single Market Act (for more detail, see the progress report on 
Europe 2020). 
•  In Member States with large current account deficits or high levels of indebtedness, 
reforms affecting wage-setting systems and services markets are important to improve 
price and wage responsiveness. Improvements in the business environment through 
enhancing competition (e.g. via the Services Directive) and reductions in administrative 
burdens will also help in this respect.  
•  Measures supporting the reallocation of resources across firms and sectors are strongly 
needed. They include an employment protection legislation which does not hinder reallocation 
of resources across sectors, better financial incentives to work and active labour market 
policies better targeted to the most vulnerable. Measures that eliminate hindrances to entry and 
exit (start-up conditions) and investment (such as the harmonisation of corporate tax bases) EN  22     EN 
will also be important in facilitating sectoral reallocation towards higher value added and 
faster growth activities.  
•  Member States with large current account surpluses need to identify and tackle the 
sources of weak domestic demand. Such policies could include further liberalisation of the 
services sector and improving the conditions for investment. 
•  All Member States should frontload structural reform efforts that remove their most 
important bottlenecks to growth in the medium-term. Based on the draft National Reform 
Programmes (NRPs) submitted by Member States, the planned measures appear to be 
insufficient in terms of ambition, and thus are unlikely to have a material impact on growth 
and jobs in the medium run. Member States, in their final NRPs, need to be much more precise 
on their reform plans, to frontload key actions and to step up their overall level of ambition.  
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Annex : Table 1. Some country-specific indicators on growth and jobs, fiscal position, financial market conditions and macro imbalances 
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09 11-12 09 11-12 09 08 09 09 09 09 09 09 09 09 09 2010-Q3 09 09 09
BE 128 1.9 67.1 0.5 7.9 125.1 -6.1 96.2 6.5 45.7 2.3 35 7.8 223 0.0 0.7 17.3 4.1 -2.4
DE 129 2.1 74.8 0.5 7.5 104.7 -3.0 73.4 4.5 41.1 6.5 30 -5.8 154 0.3 0.0 14.3 3.2 -1.8
IE 148 1.4 66.7 -0.1 11.9 132.1 -14.4 65.5 14.8 29.6 -4.7 . 20.2 387 -1.9 3.2 12.8 9 -36.1
EL 78 -0.9 65.8 0.6 9.5 98.0 -15.5 126.8 20.3 33.0 -15.4 -110 12.8 139 1.5 8.4 11.7 5.2 2.1
ES 82 1.2 63.7 -1.3 18.0 111.0 -11.1 53.2 15.3 32.3 -8.4 -90 12.4 289 -0.3 1.8 12.2 3.6 8.8
FR 121 1.7 69.6 0.9 9.5 120.6 -7.6 78.1 7.1 43.8 -2.6 -2 5.1 224 0.1 0.4 12.2 4.3 0
IT 97 1.3 61.7 0.2 7.8 109.8 -5.2 116.0 2.6 43.4 -2.7 . 14.6 176 0.8 1.5 11.7 6.9 4
CY 80 1.9 75.7 0.5 5.3 88.9 -6.0 58.0 12.5 34.2 -12.7 . 10.3 . 0.2 2.2 12.1 4.3 10
LU 281 3.0 70.4 1.8 5.1 169.9 -0.7 14.5 12.7 38.0 6.9 . 12.7 . 0.0 0.3 18.1 1.3 8
MT 57 2.1 58.8 1.3 7.0 88.1 -3.8 68.6 6.4 36.1 -6.0 . 11.5 . 2.0 1.6 24.2 1.7 17.6
NL 138 1.6 78.8 0.3 3.7 111.0 -5.4 60.8 8.5 39.0 5.5 63 8.7 251 1.0 0.2 15 0.4 -0.2
AT 138 1.9 74.7 0.7 4.8 111.6 -3.5 67.5 4.6 44.4 3.4 -4 -1.9 156 0.4 0.5 12.7 2.7 2.8
PT 61 -0.1 71.2 -0.5 9.6 74.1 -9.4 76.1 8.9 33.9 -11.0 -106 8.7 332 -1.0 3.2 10.5 2.7 5.4
SI 66 2.3 71.9 0.2 5.9 81.8 -5.8 35.4 12.2 38.0 -4.2 -35 9.2 178 1.0 1.3 11.7 2.3 1.1
SK 30 3.4 66.4 0.6 12.0 78.7 -7.9 35.4 8.5 28.9 -5.0 -43 54.2 140 1.0 1.3 12.7 3.5 5.6
FI 140 2.6 73.5 0.5 8.2 107.2 -2.7 43.8 4.3 43.2 3.0 -1 8.7 213 1.7 0.3 14.6 1.1 7.1
BG 13 3.2 68.8 0.9 6.8 38.6 -4.7 14.7 2.8 30.2 -16.4 . 50.0 . 3.2 3.6 17 11.5 8
CZ 38 2.7 70.9 0.2 6.7 71.8 -5.8 35.3 9.8 34.5 -1.5 . 41.5 . 0.7 1.2 14 - 17.1
DK 160 1.8 77.8 0.3 6.0 100.4 -2.8 41.4 -1.4 49.2 2.5 4 18.9 278 1.1 0.1 16.1 2.8 -3.8
EE 32 4.0 69.9 2.4 13.8 64.5 -1.8 7.2 1.2 36.0 4.5 -80 48.0 244 0.2 2.9 12.6 8.9 -48.5
LV 26 3.7 67.1 0.5 17.1 50.0 -10.2 36.7 9.0 27.0 -8.9 . 51.8 184 4.4 7.6 13.7 13.6 -52.4
LT 27 3.0 67.2 1.6 13.7 55.5 -9.2 29.5 10.4 30.0 -8.5 -66 29.4 132 5.1 2.7 12.9 15.4 -70.1
HU 30 3.0 60.5 0.5 10.0 70.2 -4.4 78.4 -1.3 39.6 -4.8 -120 13.0 209 4.8 4.7 14.4 7.7 22.5
PL 33 4.0 64.9 1.3 8.2 65.4 -7.2 50.9 5.6 31.9 -3.9 -64 -7.0 110 4.3 3.2 13.5 6.4 7
RO 14 2.6 63.5 0.4 6.9 47.2 -8.6 23.9 9.7 28.2 -9.8 -51 56.0 211 6.7 4.7 15.8 5.7 5.9
SE 162 2.8 78.3 0.8 8.3 111.2 -1.0 41.9 0.5 46.9 8.2 -7 -12.2 277 2.1 0.1 12.7 2 5.4
UK 143 2.4 73.9 0.4 7.6 110.3 -11.3 68.2 13.5 36.7 -1.8 . -12.3 243 2.3 0.4 14.9 3.5 0.4
EA (17) 110 1.6 69.0 0.4 9.5 109 -6.3 79.2 6.8 40.5 -0.6 -19.1 6.1 205 0.3 1.0 13.2 4 0.4
EU (27) 100 1.9 69.1 0.5 8.9 100 -6.8 74 7.5 39.8 -1.1 -3.5 4.8 208 1.0 1.2 13.6 3.9 0.6
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